Can you derive an "ought" from an "is"?

[poolerboy]

Sam Harris thinks so. If you have yet to see his TEDTalks on whether "science can answer moral questions" click here.

Here is his reasoning:

_____

How can you derive an “ought” from an “is”?

A response to David Hume (or the Hume of popular imagination).

The 18th century Scottish philosopher David Hume famously argued that no description of the way the world is (facts) can tell us how the world ought to be (values). Hume’s argument was actually directed against religious apologists who sought to deduce morality from the existence of God. Ironically, however, his reasoning has since become one of the primary impediments to linking morality to the rest of human knowledge.

The Worst Possible Misery for Everyone
(Getting from “is” to “ought” 1.0)​

FACT #1: There are behaviors, intentions, cultural practices, etc. which potentially lead to the worst possible misery for everyone. There are also behaviors, intentions, cultural practices, etc. which do not, and which, in fact, lead to states of wellbeing for many sentient creatures, to the degree that wellbeing is possible in this universe.

FACT #2: While it may often be difficult in practice, distinguishing between these two sets is possible in principle.

FACT #3: Our “values” are ways of thinking about this domain of possibilities. If we value liberty, privacy, benevolence, dignity, freedom of expression, honesty, good manners, the right to own property, etc.—we value these things only in so far as we judge them to be part of the second set of factors conducive to (someone’s) wellbeing.

FACT #4: Values, therefore, are (explicit or implicit) judgments about how the universe works and are themselves facts about our universe (i.e. states of the human brain). (Religious values, focusing on God’s will or the law of karma, are no exception: the reason to respect God’s will or the law of karma is to avoid the worst possible misery for many, most, or even all sentient beings).

FACT #5: It is possible to be confused or mistaken about how the universe works. It is, therefore, possible to have the wrong values (i.e. values which lead toward, rather than away from, the worst possible misery for everyone).

FACT #6: Given that the wellbeing of humans and animals must depend on states of the world and on states of their brains, and science represents our most systematic means of understanding these states, science can potentially help us avoid the worst possible misery for everyone.

FACT #7: In so far as our subsidiary values can be in conflict—e.g. individual rights vs. collective security; the right to privacy vs. freedom of expression—it may be possible to decide which priorities will most fully avoid the worst possible misery for many, most, or even all sentient beings. Science, therefore, can in principle (if not always in practice) determine and prioritize our subsidiary values (e.g. should we value “honor”? If so, when and how much?).

FACT #8: One cannot reasonably ask, “But why is the worst possible misery for everyone bad?”—for if the worst possible misery for everyone isn’t bad, the word “bad” has no meaning. (This would be like asking, “But why is a perfect circle round?” The question can be posed, but it expresses only confusion, not an intelligible basis for skeptical doubt.) Likewise, one cannot ask, “But why ought we avoid the worst possible misery for everyone?”—for if the term “ought” has any application at all, it is in urging us away from the worst possible misery for everyone.

FACT #9: One can, therefore, derive “ought” from “is”: for if there is a behavior, intention, cultural practice, etc. that seems likely to produce the worst possible misery for everyone, one ought not adopt it. (All lesser ethical concerns and obligations follow from this).

_____

Do you agree? Thoughts?

 

[bankside]

I like his arguments because they are either correct, or will fail in a useful way.

 

[zoltanspawn]

Though not presented in the same manner, there's a recent thread devoted to this topic here: http://www.justusboys.com/forum/showthread.php?t=300403

 

[poolerboy]

Though not presented in the same manner, there's a recent thread devoted to this topic here: http://www.justusboys.com/forum/showthread.php?t=300403

I was aware of that thread when I made this. Most people weren't really addressing the is-ought dilemma though.

 

[Kulindahr]

To a certain extent he's engaging in the practice of getting a desired result by defining his terms to fit it. If, in fact, the words mean what he defines them to mean, his conclusion is sound.

But they don't. Most people would consider that "ought" means "what one should do even if it results in pain or disaster". Most people would define "bad" in terms of it being something wrong, regardless of misery. So to a substantial degree he's supporting his argument by redefining his terms into ways not in common use (if at all).

His definition, further, is sloppy. "The worst possible misery for everyone" is not subject to definition, and thus neither is his "ought". There will be numerous enough definitions that it is doubtful that any single one would reach double-digit percentages. Many questions arise: by "everyone", do we mean those outside our social group? do we mean those in the political opposition? those in other nations? do our enemies count? what about murderers and other criminals? Very importantly, what about future generations -- do they count?

A definition with so many possible meanings and questions is hardly a definition useful for anything except conversation while drinking or daydreaming.

 

[poolerboy]

To a certain extent he's engaging in the practice of getting a desired result by defining his terms to fit it. If, in fact, the words mean what he defines them to mean, his conclusion is sound.

But they don't. Most people would consider that "ought" means "what one should do even if it results in pain or disaster".

I don't think Sam would contest to that at all. Here's what he's said:

"...I asked whether subjecting children to “pain, violence, and public humiliation” leads to “healthy emotional development and good behavior” (i.e. does it conduce to their general wellbeing and to the wellbeing of society). If it did, well then yes, I would admit that it was moral. In fact, it would appear moral to more or less everyone—just as slitting open a child’s belly to perform an emergency appendectomy seems obviously moral to anyone who understands the purpose of this procedure. The patent immorality of corporal punishment relates to the sense that it is clearly bad for children, both in the moment and in the long run (along with the fact that it is generally the product of anger, rather than benevolence, on the part of the brute holding the paddle)."​

Understand that he is talking about (in my initial post) the worse possible misery for everyone not merely doing something even if it may result in pain or disaster. If you think the word "ought" allows you to say, "Maybe we ought to seek the worst possible misery for everyone," this expresses pure confusion. How is it even conceivable that we ought to seek the worst possible misery for everyone? What could "ought" mean in this case?

Most people would define "bad" in terms of it being something wrong, regardless of misery.

The error that you're committing here is that you think Sam is defining bad in terms of misery. He is not.

His definition, further, is sloppy. "The worst possible misery for everyone" is not subject to definition, and thus neither is his "ought". There will be numerous enough definitions that it is doubtful that any single one would reach double-digit percentages. Many questions arise: by "everyone", do we mean those outside our social group? do we mean those in the political opposition? those in other nations? do our enemies count? what about murderers and other criminals? Very importantly, what about future generations -- do they count?

A definition with so many possible meanings and questions is hardly a definition useful for anything except conversation while drinking or daydreaming.

Sam has responded to critics who have raised the question of ambiguities:

"Of course, goals and conceptual definitions matter. But this holds for all phenomena and for every method we use to study them. My father, for instance, has been dead for 25 years. What do I mean by "dead"? Do I mean "dead" with reference to specific goals? Well, if you must, yes -- goals like respiration, energy metabolism, responsiveness to stimuli, etc. The definition of "life" remains, to this day, difficult to pin down. Does this mean we can't study life scientifically? No. The science of biology thrives despite such ambiguities. The concept of "health" is looser still: it, too, must be defined with reference to specific goals -- not suffering chronic pain, not always vomiting, etc. -- and these goals are continually changing. Our notion of "health" may one day be defined by goals that we cannot currently entertain with a straight face (like the goal of spontaneously regenerating a lost limb). Does this mean we can't study health scientifically?

I wonder if there is anyone on earth who would be tempted to attack the philosophical underpinnings of medicine with questions like: "What about all the people who don't share your goal of avoiding disease and early death? Who is to say that living a long life free of pain and debilitating illness is 'healthy'? What makes you think that you could convince a person suffering from fatal gangrene that he is not as healthy you are?" And yet, these are precisely the kinds of objections I face when I speak about morality in terms of human and animal well-being. Is it possible to voice such doubts in human speech? Yes. But that doesn't mean we should take them seriously."​

 

[AsianDream]

Oughts are in most cases the main building blocks of Human missery.

Whether this is "thou ought not be gay" to all people "ought" to be blonde and blue eyed - oughts have a lot to answer for.

As this is a male gay sex site - the oughts I would single out are those that have limited guys ability to experience love and truly enjoy thier body (for what little time we've got it in good working order).

That may sound like a hedonistic idea of life - but I'd also overlay this with the central idea of many religions - that you "ought" to try to do good to other people whenever you can.

 

[bankside]

To a certain extent he's engaging in the practice of getting a desired result by defining his terms to fit it. If, in fact, the words mean what he defines them to mean, his conclusion is sound.

If he's only doing that to a certain extent, I'm curious to hear your thoughts on what he is doing beyond that extent.

 

[poolerboy]

Here's a really good excerpt from Sam to get the debating juices going:

"So, while it is possible to say that one can't move from "is" to "ought," we should be honest about how we get to "is" in the first place. Scientific "is" statements rest on implicit "oughts" all the way down. When I say, "Water is two parts hydrogen and one part oxygen," I have uttered a quintessential statement of scientific fact. But what if someone doubts this statement? I can appeal to data from chemistry, describing the outcome of simple experiments. But in so doing, I implicitly appeal to the values of empiricism and logic. What if my interlocutor doesn't share these values? What can I say then? What evidence could prove that we should value evidence? What logic could demonstrate the importance of logic? As it turns out, these are the wrong questions. The right question is, why should we care what such a person thinks in the first place?

So it is with the linkage between morality and well-being: To say that morality is arbitrary (or culturally constructed, or merely personal), because we must first assume that the well-being of conscious creatures is good, is exactly like saying that science is arbitrary (or culturally constructed, or merely personal), because we must first assume that a rational understanding of the universe is good. We need not enter either of these philosophical cul-de-sacs."​

 

[Kulindahr]

If he's only doing that to a certain extent, I'm curious to hear your thoughts on what he is doing beyond that extent.

I knew I should have added it at the time; for the life of me, I can't remember what I had in mind.

 

[bankside]

Here's a really good excerpt from Sam to get the debating juices going:

"So, while it is possible to say that one can't move from "is" to "ought," we should be honest about how we get to "is" in the first place. Scientific "is" statements rest on implicit "oughts" all the way down. When I say, "Water is two parts hydrogen and one part oxygen," I have uttered a quintessential statement of scientific fact. But what if someone doubts this statement? I can appeal to data from chemistry, describing the outcome of simple experiments. But in so doing, I implicitly appeal to the values of empiricism and logic. What if my interlocutor doesn't share these values? What can I say then? What evidence could prove that we should value evidence? What logic could demonstrate the importance of logic? As it turns out, these are the wrong questions. The right question is, why should we care what such a person thinks in the first place?

So it is with the linkage between morality and well-being: To say that morality is arbitrary (or culturally constructed, or merely personal), because we must first assume that the well-being of conscious creatures is good, is exactly like saying that science is arbitrary (or culturally constructed, or merely personal), because we must first assume that a rational understanding of the universe is good. We need not enter either of these philosophical cul-de-sacs."​

That's good but he should have said culs-de-sac.

But I won't quibble.

Well, yeah, I just did, didn't I?

 

[poolerboy]

That's good but he should have said culs-de-sac.

But I won't quibble.

Well, yeah, I just did, didn't I?

lol

*slaps bankside upside the head*

 

[TX-Beau]

That's good but he should have said culs-de-sac.

But I won't quibble.

Well, yeah, I just did, didn't I?

evidently it's bi-textural - it swings both ways.

Main Entry: cul–de–sac
Pronunciation: \ˈkəl-di-ˌsak,…
Function: noun
Inflected Form(s): plural culs–de–sac … also cul–de–sacs

http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/cul-de-sac

 

[bankside]

evidently it's bi-textural - it swings both ways.

Main Entry: cul–de–sac
Pronunciation: ˈkəl-di-ˌsak,…
Function: noun
Inflected Form(s): plural culs–de–sac … also cul–de–sacs

http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/cul-de-sac

Given that it is a French word at origin, it is obvious that we should consult an English dictionary. And by English I mean British.

From Oxford:

cul-de-sac
/kuldsak/

• noun (pl. culs-de-sac pronunc. same) a street or passage closed at one end.

— ORIGIN originally a term in anatomy: from French, ‘bottom of a sack’.

There is only one plural form. Oxford politely alludes to its "anatomical" origin - perhaps a little too politely, and a little too alludey - so for clarity, if I may be a little more colloquial in my translation: "arse-end of the bag."

Or if you will, arse-ends of the bag. Both what it is and what it ought to be.

See what I did there? Bankside: King of return-to-topic segue.

 

[TX-Beau]

LOL

What's the quote

...America and England - two nations divided by the same language...

Anyway we in America are the KINGS of the cu-de-sacs!!

I must insist on Webster.

 

[poolerboy]

Given that it is a French word at origin, it is obvious that we should consult an English dictionary. And by English I mean British.

From Oxford:



There is only one plural form. Oxford politely alludes to its "anatomical" origin - perhaps a little too politely, and a little too alludey - so for clarity, if I may be a little more colloquial in my translation: "arse-end of the bag."

Or if you will, arse-ends of the bag. Both what it is and what it ought to be.

See what I did there? Bankside: King of return-to-topic segue.

COLO[STRIKE]U[/STRIKE]R <--yes I went there.


Now gents, could we?

 

[Kulindahr]

lol

*slaps bankside upside the head*

Is it possible to slap someone downside the head?

 

[bankside]

Sorry poolerboy. I know we have lurkers who find these conversations intense sometimes so I'm hoping that a bit of humour in these kinds of threads will encourage participation.

That being said, what if it didn't matter? Perhaps morality is just pragmatically adaptive and it has escaped the winnowing effect of natural selection. Here's a study:
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/art...ifference-good-evil-months-study-reveals.html

I don't think that undermines Harris, in fact, but it does provide some interesting context that no matter how we conceptualise this intellectually, our brains may be biased in favour of certain judgements.

 

[poolerboy]

Is it possible to slap someone downside the head?

You might be onto a kōan.

 

[TX-Beau]

Sorry poolerboy. I know we have lurkers who find these conversations intense sometimes so I'm hoping that a bit of humour in these kinds of threads will encourage participation.

That being said, what if it didn't matter? Perhaps morality is just pragmatically adaptive and it has escaped the winnowing effect of natural selection. Here's a study:
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/art...ifference-good-evil-months-study-reveals.html

I don't think that undermines Harris, in fact, but it does provide some interesting context that no matter how we conceptualise this intellectually, our brains may be biased in favour of certain judgements.

I've always thought that ethics and morals are evolutionary survival behavior. We humans are communal creatures, we always have been. Our numbers and our cooperation make us strong. We survive through community, through group dynamic. We do not do so well as lone individuals explicitly thinking only about ourselves.