Science can answer moral questions

[zoltanspawn]

That's true. I've seen a few non-believers get really worked up over his methods of trying to assign value to human life through "scientific morality" etc.

There's also the camp of those so worked up over his methods they'll repeat them once, and then repeat them again. Dr. Harris has the talent of provoking his admirers as well as his detractors.

 

[hotatlboi]

this just in
atheist's have no morals
more at eleven.

False. They just have a different basis for most of their morals than religious people.

 

[AsianDream]

I think it's better in the long run to have your beliefs track reality than to be delusional. This is why so many religious folks are profoundly confused with what is moral and not moral (e.g. taboo foods, homosexuality, thought crimes like 'lust in your heart', etc.).

If beliefs don't match reality - then they are by definition delusional.

The problem is that reality mostly is different to “common sense” human ideas – but that is how reality actually works.

The 20 th Century is one where many people have come under the control of almost ultimate evil.

It’s a moot point if they yet have escaped this.

 

[randomfreak]

While I am also a proponent of welfare-maximization, I think you are oversimplifying the dilemma a bit too much. =)

Technically, this situation also maximizes total welfare:

Make a lottery where everyone is required to take a ticket. The "winner" of the lottery is euthanized and the organs are donated to critically ill patients. You can save more than 5 lives through the death of 1 person. Social welfare increases.

But is that moral? By the standards you use, yes.

You might object "but that is killing an innocent human being in the process, so it's immoral!"

Then take this situation:

You are floating on a lifeboat with 6 other people. However, the lifeboat can only hold the weight of 5 people or it will sink. One person needs to jump into the ocean and drown for the other 5 to survive. (To avoid the option of killing yourself, assume that you are really skinny and the others are overweight, so your jumping wouldn't make a difference and someone else still needs to jump anyway.) Nobody wants to die, so you hold a lottery, then the "winner" of the lottery has to jump into the ocean.

Is that immoral? The criteria are the same, so why does one situation seem moral while the other does not? (I blame our brains for this. See prospect theory.)

Morality is much more complex than just "maximizing well-being."

 

[poolerboy]

No, I'm not advocating for consequentialism — which is what you're referring to — which has bounded up the notion of morality to be a mere body-count exercise. The challenge is to have a definition of well-being that is truly open-ended and can absorb everything we care about. Consider the Trolley Problem: If there just is, in fact, a difference between pushing a person onto the tracks and flipping a switch — perhaps in terms of the emotional consequences of performing these actions — well, then this difference has to be taken into account. It seems to me that the challenge is to get clear about what the actual consequences of an action are, about what changes in human experience are possible, and about which changes matter.

 

[zoltanspawn]

If beliefs don't match reality - then they are by definition delusional.

I'm not sure about dividing all our beliefs into two camps, those that match reality and the delusional. Some middle ground that comes to mind immediately are inaccurate/semi-accurate beliefs which do not match reality, yet are not delusory. Another kind may be imaginative beliefs, like those of a child or someone contemplating fiction which don't correspond to reality, yet are not delusions.

 

[randomfreak]

Technically, consequantialism doesn't have to just be a body-count exercise. It just dictates that, if the outcome is overall good, then the actions taken are moral. Even if we have a different definition of "well-being", what you're advocating is still consequentialism. Change "human lives" into "utility" or "well-being" and the problem is still there.

Even if we can make a comprehensive definition of "well-being", I am willing to bet that we can still make questionable scenarios like the ones I mentioned. Nothing is ever truly free; everything is a tradeoff. One person's benefit is at another person's cost. Which exchanges are "good" is up to argument.

 

[poolerboy]

Technically, consequantialism doesn't have to just be a body-count exercise. It just dictates that, if the outcome is overall good, then the actions taken are moral. Even if we have a different definition of "well-being", what you're advocating is still consequentialism. Change "human lives" into "utility" or "well-being" and the problem is still there.

Even if we can make a comprehensive definition of "well-being", I am willing to bet that we can still make questionable scenarios like the ones I mentioned. Nothing is ever truly free; everything is a tradeoff. One person's benefit is at another person's cost. Which exchanges are "good" is up to argument.

Without potential consequences at the level of experience -- happiness, suffering, joy, despair, etc. -- all talk of value is empty.

Nonetheless, such puzzles only suggest that certain moral questions could be difficult or impossible to answer in practice, they don't suggest that morality depends upon something other than the consenquences of our actions and intentions. Consequentialism is less a method of answering moral questions than it is a claim about the status of moral truth. The fact that it may often be difficult, or even impossible, to know what the consequences of our thoughts and actions will be does not mean that there is some other basis for human values that is worth worrying about.

 

[Kulindahr]

I think it's productive to have some agreed-upon objective morality, which we have in science. And I'm not disagreeing with the goalposts fallacy, so I might just be in the wrong thread.

Science provides no morality at all; it merely tells us what is.

We need to define and agree upon a common goal of 'well-being for all sentient creatures' or whatever, and then try to use a preponderance of scientific evidence to persuade them that what they're doing causes more measurable harm than good to the well-being of those creatures. And then hopefully they buy it.

So you need to do exactly what everyone who's started their own religion does. How is this any different? Honesty would suggest you just admit you're starting your own religion.

With any kind of god, morality would be arbitrary.
The unconstrained whim of a god to would be no less arbitrary a basis for determining morality. This is a really key point here.

In contrast, you could hold that a god would be particularly gifted at creating a, well, moral standard of morality.

But the problem with that is of course that morality is now a greater abstract to which god must adhere when he/she/it sets down an "absolute" moral code for us to follow.

That shows nicely that you have no clue about the great religions, especially the monotheistic ones: there is nothing arbitrary about the definition of good and evil, nor are they separate standards apart from God.

The solution/result to that is a middle-school exercise in logic.

 

[Kulindahr]

Without potential consequences at the level of experience -- happiness, suffering, joy, despair, etc. -- all talk of value is empty.

Nonetheless, such puzzles only suggest that certain moral questions could be difficult or impossible to answer in practice, they don't suggest that morality depends upon something other than the consenquences of our actions and intentions. Consequentialism is less a method of answering moral questions than it is a claim about the status of moral truth. The fact that it may often be difficult, or even impossible, to know what the consequences of our thoughts and actions will be does not mean that there is some other basis for human values that is worth worrying about.

But now you've reduced morality to feelings, making it totally subjective.

It would be more scientific to base it on evolution. Morality then would dictate that the least intelligent and most sickly not be allowed to reproduce, along with anyone with a demonstrable genetic defect. Marriages would be determined by matching people with characteristics to lead to healthier individuals in the next generation, or at least allowed or forbidden by such criteria. All results of sexual intercourse would be examined in the womb and any which did not match up to minimum standards would be aborted.

The results of those actions would be a better race. In light of reality, how is that not more moral than providing for general happiness?

 

[Kulindahr]

If there is evidence there seems to be no need for faith. Faith is more a feeling of truth leading to trust, absent of evidence. This is why people believe there is a God rather than know. But since this thread addresses the question of morality, what amount or type of faith could possibly corroborate religious moral assertions of dietary laws, homosexuality, thought crimes, nonbelief, etc.? Just on taboo foods alone one should see the obvious moral confusion held by a believer.

Why is a Marine not in the field required to make his bunk something beyond tidily?

 

[bankside]

That shows nicely that you have no clue about the great religions, especially the monotheistic ones: there is nothing arbitrary about the definition of good and evil, nor are they separate standards apart from God.

The solution/result to that is a middle-school exercise in logic.

If that were true, I rather think a middle-school teacher would have explained it to me. I did well in "middle school" as you call it.

But surely if that were true it would be no problem for you to explain it now, rather than just dismiss my statement, n'est-ce pas?

 

[Kulindahr]

If that were true, I rather think a middle-school teacher would have explained it to me. I did well in "middle school" as you call it.

But surely if that were true it would be no problem for you to explain it now, rather than just dismiss my statement, n'est-ce pas?

I was leaving it as an exercise for the student.

Hint: it involves a concept sometimes called "identity".

 

[bankside]

I was leaving it as an exercise for the student.

Hint: it involves a concept sometimes called "identity".

Mmm. I didn't think so. I had hoped.....

 

[poolerboy]

But now you've reduced morality to feelings, making it totally subjective.

As I said before, feelings are subjective but they're subjective ontologically, not epistemologically. Our well-being is tracked by states of the universe and states of our brains, and because of this science can answer, in principle, questions regarding how best to maximize well-being.

poolerboy, there isn't any confusion about the food question. Have you read the Acts of the Apostles Chapter 10, verses 11-16?

There was a reason why I directed this moral confusion toward Jews and Muslims, as Christians, as far as I am aware, have no taboo foods except for maybe Good Friday but that's more a liturgical practice than a moral edict. But take my other examples that do apply to your faith: homosexuality, thought crimes, or graven images. What can be argued, besides making appeals to blind obedience to authority, to justify placing these in the purview of morality?

 

[Kulindahr]

As I said before, feelings are subjective but they're subjective ontologically, not epistemologically. Our well-being is tracked by states of the universe and states of our brains, and because of this science can answer, in principle, questions regarding how best to maximize well-being.

That's nothing but more subjectivity: who defines "well-being"? That comes down to people's feelings. There is no objective way to get from science to "well-being" -- it can't even tell you if the term ought to apply to individuals, families, tribes, nations.....

There was a reason why I directed this moral confusion toward Jews and Muslims, as Christians, as far as I am aware, have no taboo foods except for maybe Good Friday but that's more a liturgical practice than a moral edict. But take my other examples that do apply to your faith: homosexuality, thought crimes, or graven images. What can be argued, besides making appeals to blind obedience to authority, to justify placing these in the purview of morality?

To me the section in the Catholic Catechism is more Aristotle than Scripture. And I still haven't heard a good answer to why, if St. Paul can tell people to just find a wife instead of put up with lust, that argument can't be made for gays.


The "thought crimes" bit is a misnomer, and your reference is making the ancient mistake of taking things out of context. Without the part preceding that "but....", the statements are worthless. A quick read of the context makes it plain that Jesus is talking to people who've been trained in this notion that if they can put their little checkmarks in the boxes next to the rules, saying, "Didn't do that!", then they think they're fine, while He's pointing out that such is not what was meant. Theologically, He's saying that the Law was never concerned with surface behavior, but with changing the person on/from the inside.

Yet even taken out of context, the statements ring true. It's a known reality in psychology that people who practice doing something mentally are more likely to do it in reality (interestingly, an experiment was done with some pro basketball players that demonstrates this even applies to sports performance). It's why in anger management and other kinds of therapy, people are required to mentally rehearse other forms of action.

It's also a misnomer because it's again reading the Bible like a shopping list or a menu, making it about rules. Jesus isn't talking about rules, He's talking about changing people. And the person who runs around undressing others with his eyes and beating off to thoughts of them is degrading himself, making himself less of a person than he could be, because the result of such thoughts is to reduce the other person to an object.


I suppose the graven images bit is stretching the bounds of what we think of as morality. It's more like Serge in Beverly Hills Cop, who says, "Don't be stupid!" -- making images and worshiping them is just, well, stupid.
[note: there was no absolute prohibition against making images; within just a few chapters, God is commanding the making of pomegranates, cherubim, and more, thus indicating that the so-called "second commandment" is actually a footnote to the one before]

 

[Kulindahr]

Mmm. I didn't think so. I had hoped.....

Here's the proposition:

A. there is nothing arbitrary about the definition of good and evil
B. nor are they separate standards apart from God.

I phrased it so the answer is right there in the elements, and you're saying you can't complete the syllogism?!

 

[poolerboy]

I have a hard copy of the Catechism of the Catholic Church, and as I noticed that there are more words in the Hard copy than what is on the Vatican website.

Here's an example of what is missing:

In #2358: Here's the missing line:

They do not choose their Homosexual condition;....

So, Guys, what do you think of these missing lines?

I'm sure that there are more missing lines if and when I have the time to sort through them.

Firstly, there are many "deviant" behaviors that can be inborn. Some people have a genetic predisposition to alcoholism for example, and yet that is often considered a "deviant" behavior (and Christianity insists on calling it immoral). While the written Catechism may add that to its statement, it certainly doesn't shy away from disparaging and denouncing it. Hmmmm.

Secondly, you're missing the point. Who cares whether or not it said that particular sentence! Assume it did or it didn't. Why should that matter either way? The justification for the validity of their moral statements shouldn't rest on the fact that it's coming from a supposed authority, but that it can withstand rational justification for the welfare of conscious creatures. Quibbling over whether this book really said this or that is pointless blind obedience of "it says so in my holy writings so it must be moral." Women cannot be ordained in the Church and the Vatican has now even threatened excommunication. If these are valid positions, they are valid because one can advance a clear and legitimate justificaiton based on reason and/or evidence that these things negatively affect the well-being of conscious creatures.

That's nothing but more subjectivity: who defines "well-being"? That comes down to people's feelings. There is no objective way to get from science to "well-being" -- it can't even tell you if the term ought to apply to individuals, families, tribes, nations.....

Who defines health? Who defines life? Who defines physics? The scientific community is in the business of framing conversations and coming up with definitions. After establishing consciousness as the only way the term morality could possibly apply, we must acknowledge well-being naturally follows from it. For if the term morality is to mean anything at all it is compelling us to gravitate toward it and shun the opposite. Otherwise, the word is meaningless and therefore pointless to have in our vocabulary. That people can articulate differences of opinion on what morality means to them presents no more a problem for a science of morality any more than a Christian scientist coming to a science conference and claiming that physics should be defined as an endeavor to map the Book of Genesis onto the cosmos.

As for your concern that "there is no objective way to get from science to 'well-being'" consider this:

Science is defined with reference to the goal of understanding the process at work in the universe. Can we justify this goal scientifically? Of course not. Does this make science itself unscientific? That would be nonsense. In any event, the notion of "ought" is an artificial and needlessly confusing way to think about moral choice. The term morality necessarily relates to well-being of conscious beings. For instance, to say that we ought to treat children with kindness seems identical to saying that everyone will tend to be better off if we do. The person who claims that he does not want to be better off is either wrong about what he does, in fact, want (i.e. he doesn't know what he's missing), or he is lying, or he is not making sense.

To me the section in the Catholic Catechism is more Aristotle than Scripture. And I still haven't heard a good answer to why, if St. Paul can tell people to just find a wife instead of put up with lust, that argument can't be made for gays.


The "thought crimes" bit is a misnomer, and your reference is making the ancient mistake of taking things out of context. Without the part preceding that "but....", the statements are worthless. A quick read of the context makes it plain that Jesus is talking to people who've been trained in this notion that if they can put their little checkmarks in the boxes next to the rules, saying, "Didn't do that!", then they think they're fine, while He's pointing out that such is not what was meant. Theologically, He's saying that the Law was never concerned with surface behavior, but with changing the person on/from the inside.

Yet even taken out of context, the statements ring true. It's a known reality in psychology that people who practice doing something mentally are more likely to do it in reality (interestingly, an experiment was done with some pro basketball players that demonstrates this even applies to sports performance). It's why in anger management and other kinds of therapy, people are required to mentally rehearse other forms of action.

It's also a misnomer because it's again reading the Bible like a shopping list or a menu, making it about rules. Jesus isn't talking about rules, He's talking about changing people. And the person who runs around undressing others with his eyes and beating off to thoughts of them is degrading himself, making himself less of a person than he could be, because the result of such thoughts is to reduce the other person to an object.

[red highlight, mine]

To the portion I've highlighted in red, the issue makes no sense in terms of morality. No one is being harmed in lusting after someone especially since lust does not function like a light switch. Sure, one could consciously try to go out of one's way to take everything and create a perverted thought, but even this wouldn't make it a "moral" issue. Lust itself is another emotion like love that organically occurs and not something you can artificially superimpose on something (like suggesting that people love their enemies; sure, it can be said, but the statement is meaningless in the context of how the human mind functions).

Creating symbolic morality that affects no one is precisely the point I was getting at (like having sex outside of marriage). I'm getting at the bigger issue here of moral messages that are simply confused about morality.

 

[bankside]

Here's the proposition:

A. there is nothing arbitrary about the definition of good and evil
B. nor are they separate standards apart from God.

I phrased it so the answer is right there in the elements, and you're saying you can't complete the [STRIKE]syllogism[/STRIKE] tautology?!

Fixed that for you.

 

[Kulindahr]

The justification for the validity of their moral statements shouldn't rest on the fact that it's coming from a supposed authority, but that it can withstand rational justification for the welfare of conscious creatures. Quibbling over whether this book really said this or that is pointless blind obedience of "it says so in my holy writings so it must be moral." Women cannot be ordained in the Church and the Vatican has now even threatened excommunication. If these are valid positions, they are valid because one can advance a clear and legitimate justificaiton based on reason and/or evidence that these things negatively affect the well-being of conscious creatures.


Who defines health? Who defines life? Who defines physics? The scientific community is in the business of framing conversations and coming up with definitions. After establishing consciousness as the only way the term morality could possibly apply, we must acknowledge well-being naturally follows from it. For if the term morality is to mean anything at all it is compelling us to gravitate toward it and shun the opposite. Otherwise, the word is meaningless and therefore pointless to have in our vocabulary. That people can articulate differences of opinion on what morality means to them presents no more a problem for a science of morality any more than a Christian scientist coming to a science conference and claiming that physics should be defined as an endeavor to map the Book of Genesis onto the cosmos.

As for your concern that "there is no objective way to get from science to 'well-being'" consider this:

Science is defined with reference to the goal of understanding the process at work in the universe. Can we justify this goal scientifically? Of course not. Does this make science itself unscientific? That would be nonsense. In any event, the notion of "ought" is an artificial and needlessly confusing way to think about moral choice. The term morality necessarily relates to well-being of conscious beings. For instance, to say that we ought to treat children with kindness seems identical to saying that everyone will tend to be better off if we do. The person who claims that he does not want to be better off is either wrong about what he does, in fact, want (i.e. he doesn't know what he's missing), or he is lying, or he is not making sense.

I put your statements of faith in magenta.

Science has nothing to say about morals until one chooses a position to start from. It cannot, for example, say that the society which exposes all deformed infants is more or less moral that the one that lets them grow up but requires them to be on their own once they turn sixteen or the one that takes care of them from cradle to grave -- in fact, a far stronger argument could be made for the morality of either of the first two than for the third.