The world is only 6 thousand years old ...

[zoltanspawn]

Creationism doesn't contradict reason any more than the existence of the universe.

Old Creationism contradicts reason because there is no good reason or evidence to suppose a literal creator. That is, it's unreasonable to suppose something for no reason (lacking a ritual purpose).

Of course, you must have some reason for supposing a literal creator. (Unless you think a literal creator is self-evident.)

Are you arguing that the existence of the universe is such a good reason?

 

[TX-Beau]

reason, reasonable - these terms cover a lot of ground, exactly how are you defining them?

 

[zoltanspawn]

I think a general definition of reason like 'deliberating coherently to solve problems' is serviceable enough here.

I don't think Old Creationism is making a scientific assertion. It's not testable. If there is evidence available to review, it is review-able chiefly by reflection and not practical observation.

 

[Jacquemar]

Old Creationism contradicts reason because there is no good reason or evidence to suppose a literal creator. That is, it's unreasonable to suppose something for no reason (lacking a ritual purpose).

Of course, you must have some reason for supposing a literal creator. (Unless you think a literal creator is self-evident.)

Are you arguing that the existence of the universe is such a good reason?

A lot of people in these threads have claimed that scientific evidence lead them to conclude that there was a creator. I would like to hear about that evidence (barring the "irreducible complexity" silliness).

Marcus Aurelius tried to argue "existence of the universe is evidence for a creator." He failed to convince me.

 

[mightbe]

A lot of people in these threads have claimed that scientific evidence lead them to conclude that there was a creator. I would like to hear about that evidence (barring the "irreducible complexity" silliness).

Marcus Aurelius tried to argue "existence of the universe is evidence for a creator." He failed to convince me.

Well, to be fair you were reading Marcus Aurelius.

Citing your interest in the ontological argument, it stands to reason that you may have read works by some or all of the following: Plato, Anselm of Canterbury, Avicenna, Descartes, Leibniz, and Godel. It would also stand to reason that you may have read some of the critics (some of which believe in a deity while others don't): Aquinas, Hume, Kant, Russell and Dennett. If you step outside philosophers and the like, there's always Sagan and Dawkins, though to honest the philosophical critiques explore greater depths.

The major problem I see with "reasoning" God into existence is that you must start with a definition. THWACK! went the logic hammer. I would argue that it is impossible to define God without first assessing one's existence. The essence of the argument is "God exists because that's how I started the proof". Even the most modern versions of this have to acknowledge that the premise is unestablished.

However, I see no such logical noose in using Occam's razor. It makes more sense to appeal to the fewest number of assumptions possible. Naturalistic theories are adequate (not to be confused with "correct") at describing the development of the universe, the evolution of life from chemical processes, and how life might eventually become intelligent enough to develop religion and deities. Because no supernatural input is necessary, a universe with a supernatural creator is identical to one without. Therefore, the existence or nonexistence of a god is irrelevant for describing such a universe.

 

[zoltanspawn]

I think the argument for god based on the existence of the universe is usually known as the Cosmological
argument, which doesn't seem to suffer from the same critique you aimed at the OA.

 

[Kulindahr]

I think a general definition of reason like 'deliberating coherently to solve problems' is serviceable enough here.

I don't think Old Creationism is making a scientific assertion. It's not testable. If there is evidence available to review, it is review-able chiefly by reflection and not practical observation.

I don't know that "solving problems" is a good way to put it. We use reason for a lot of other things, not just problem-solving.

The existence of the universe is a problem for reason -- the philosopher's version of the question is "Why is there something rather than nothing?" Some really bizarre philosophers say there actually is nothing, but that fails on Descartes' rock. But it's fairly common in philosophy to decide that there must have been a starting point, that something can't come from nothing. So to conclude there was a Creator is quite logical.

 

[bankside]

Why is there some creator rather than no creator?

Welcome to "infinite regress."

 

[Kulindahr]

However, I see no such logical noose in using Occam's razor. It makes more sense to appeal to the fewest number of assumptions possible. Naturalistic theories are adequate (not to be confused with "correct") at describing the development of the universe, the evolution of life from chemical processes, and how life might eventually become intelligent enough to develop religion and deities. Because no supernatural input is necessary, a universe with a supernatural creator is identical to one without. Therefore, the existence or nonexistence of a god is irrelevant for describing such a universe.

Occam's Razor says to take the simplest explanation. It's simpler to presume that there is just one universe and one source, rather than presuming an incredibly complex array of "all possible things", which is what modern physics increasingly points to.

 

[Kulindahr]

Why is there some creator rather than no creator?

Welcome to "infinite regress."

Infinite regress only occurs with 'materialist' physics -- for physics, there's either no explanation at all to the universe, or it's "turtles all the way down".

 

[bankside]

Infinite regress only occurs with 'materialist' physics -- for physics, there's either no explanation at all to the universe, or it's "turtles all the way down".

You didn't answer the question.

 

[zoltanspawn]

... But it's fairly common in philosophy to decide that there must have been a starting point, that something can't come from nothing. So to conclude there was a Creator is quite logical.

It might be common to decide there's a starting point, but it's also common to decide that there is not a starting point.

I don't see any logic in describing this unknown starting point/thing as a Creator.

 

[TX-Beau]

I think a general definition of reason like 'deliberating coherently to solve problems' is serviceable enough here.

I don't think Old Creationism is making a scientific assertion. It's not testable. If there is evidence available to review, it is review-able chiefly by reflection and not practical observation.

This is why I prefer terms with a bit more specificity, such as fact and logic. That definition of reason (which I grant is as accurate as any) requires us to make assumptions about what deliberating coherently encompasses. That could be very very different person to person, especially when speaking to the religions whose definitions of coherent deliberation are almost uniformly the opposite of mine.

Kuli thinks Creationism is reasonable, I think creationism and things like Resurrection are equally unreasonable and can't see why anyone would defend them as such.

I also think "science" and Creationism are incompatible. If it isn't testable and falsifiable, it just isn't science. Period. Anything that requires the assumption of divinity can never be "science," you can never, ever test it - it remains speculation. There are also plenty of things theoretical scientists of one stripe or another propose that fall into the same category, but at least they usually have some method of explaining why they posit what they do, which begs the question of why the religious propose divinity, what supports that assertion? As far as I've ever been able to tell, that has always been assertion based on assertion. I say because he said...

Which brings us squarely back to definitions. If one posits that a divine creation is "reasonable." exactly what do we mean by divinity?

 

[TX-Beau]

This of course is all exacerbated by the fact that most religions and their divine creations are mutually exclusive, so why Yahweh and not Shiva the destroyer? What makes one claim one's own divinity is reasonable while simultaneously dismissing all others as fable?

 

[zoltanspawn]

This is why I prefer terms with a bit more specificity, such as fact and logic. That definition of reason (which I grant is as accurate as any) requires us to make assumptions about what deliberating coherently encompasses. That could be very very different person to person, especially when speaking to the religions whose definitions of coherent deliberation are almost uniformly the opposite of mine.

The purpose of my original post was to point out a difference between science and reason. Science is a particular kind of reason which conducts itself in special ways. I intended a very general definition of reason as a contrast to the particular ways science is defined. I don't think that using "more specific" terms in place of 'reason' would have helped me to make that point and in all likelihood would have only served to confuse the issue.

 

[Kulindahr]

I also think "science" and Creationism are incompatible. If it isn't testable and falsifiable, it just isn't science. Period. Anything that requires the assumption of divinity can never be "science," you can never, ever test it - it remains speculation. There are also plenty of things theoretical scientists of one stripe or another propose that fall into the same category, but at least they usually have some method of explaining why they posit what they do, which begs the question of why the religious propose divinity, what supports that assertion? As far as I've ever been able to tell, that has always been assertion based on assertion. I say because he said...

Your first and second statements are not related.

I also want to point out the the claim that "the religious propose divinity" is an a priori assumption on your part: it assumes that there was a question, and the idea of divinity was thought up to answer it.

 

[Kulindahr]

The purpose of my original post was to point out a difference between science and reason. Science is a particular kind of reason which conducts itself in special ways. I intended a very general definition of reason as a contrast to the particular ways science is defined. I don't think that using "more specific" terms in place of 'reason' would have helped me to make that point and in all likelihood would have only served to confuse the issue.

There's a huge difference between science and reason. The latter requires the former, but the former does not require the latter.

 

[TX-Beau]

The purpose of my original post was to point out a difference between science and reason. Science is a particular kind of reason which conducts itself in special ways. I intended a very general definition of reason as a contrast to the particular ways science is defined. I don't think that using "more specific" terms in place of 'reason' would have helped me to make that point and in all likelihood would have only served to confuse the issue.

But that's precisely the point, reasonable is largely a value judgement, you say reason thinking it clarifies, I interpret reason in ways you didn't mean.

 

[TX-Beau]

Your first and second statements are not related.

I also want to point out the the claim that "the religious propose divinity" is an a priori assumption on your part: it assumes that there was a question, and the idea of divinity was thought up to answer it.

Only a religious person would say that there was never a question, because a religious person IS the one making the assumption in the first place.

 

[bankside]

There is no valid answer for "Why is there something rather than nothing?" that does not also apply to "Why is there some creator rather than no creator."

Once we establish that something does not require a creator, that is as plausible for universes as it is for divinities.
Once we assume that something does not require a creator, that is as plausible for universes as it is for divinities.